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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The first edition of this Egmont Paper was released exactly one year ago. Its aim was
to explore the wider context that could help explain the decision of thousands of
mostly young European volunteers to journey to a faraway war theatre in the Levant.
This Egmont Paper is a thoroughly revised, updated and expanded version. Several
new features have been introduced. It proposes, firstly, a more systematic attempt
at understanding why people with different social backgrounds feel attracted by
Islamic State (IS). Two categories of Syria travellers (a more general term than
‘foreign fighters’) can be identified. The first group comprises pre-existing kinship
and friendship gangs. For them, joining IS is merely a shift to another form of deviant
behaviour, next to membership of street gangs, rioting, drug trafficking and juvenile
delinquency. But it adds a thrilling, larger-than-life dimension to their way of life –
transforming them from delinquents without a future into mujahedeen with a cause.
Whereas most individuals of the first group are known to the police, this is not neces-
sarily the case for the second group. Before suddenly deciding to leave for Syria, the
youngsters in this group showed no sign of deviant behaviour and nothing seemed
to distinguish them from their peers. But frequently they refer to the absence of a
future, to personal difficulties they faced in their everyday life, to feelings of exclu-
sion and an absence of belonging, as if they didn’t have a stake in society. They are
often solitary, isolated adolescents, frequently at odds with family and friends, in
search of belonging and a cause to embrace. At a certain point, the accumulation of
such estrangements resulted in anger.
The relative share of both groups may differ according to national backgrounds. But,
however different in background and motivations, they share common characteris-
tics. Together these constitute the subculture on which IS’ power of attraction
thrives. ‘No future’ is the essence of the youth subculture that drives the majority of
Syria travellers from the West. The explanation for their decision is found not in how
they think, but in how they feel. Going to Syria is an escape from an everyday life
seemingly without prospects. Vulnerability, frustration, perceptions of inequity, and
a feeling that by traveling to Syria they have nothing to lose and everything to gain,
are common traits among both groups.
Religion is not of the essence. Europol has also begun to acknowledge the declining
role of religion in the foreign fighters issue. Religion has systematically decreased as
a driver of terrorism as the waves of foreign fighters succeed one another.
This is the second new feature of this updated Egmont Paper. On closer examination,
the current foreign fighters movement represents the fourth wave of jihadi
terrorism, as originally conceived by Marc Sageman in 2008. The first wave fought3
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEagainst the Soviets in Afghanistan and became the companions-in-arms of Osama bin
Laden. The second wave were often elite expatriates from the Middle East who went
to the West to attend universities. Motivated by the suffering of Muslims in Bosnia,
Chechnya, Kashmir and the Philippines, they volunteered to fight in those hotspots.
But by 2004-2005, the first two waves of truly global jihadi travellers had reached
their limits.
The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 breathed new life into the decaying jihadi
terrorist scene. A new wave of radicals emerged, angered by this invasion. This wave
was labelled ‘home-grown’. They entered the jihadi scene through local kinship and
friendship bonds, and were often connected to the global context via the internet.
By 2008-2010, the third wave had also run its course.
The start of the civil war in Syria in 2012 and the emergence of powerful jihadi groups
in the Levant – in particular IS – once again reinvigorated the waning jihadi
movement. It gave rise to a new, fourth wave of militants and wannabe foreign
fighters. The fourth wave resembles its immediate predecessor by the local dynamics
of their respective networks. Nowadays they too are formed among friends and
family who have known each other for years. Distinct from the third wave is the
opportunity to link up with one another on the battlefield, as part of a conquering
terrorist and insurgent organisation – IS. As a result, technical expertise can again be
acquired and skills transferred, in particular training with assault weapons.
Just like the preceding waves, the fourth wave of foreign fighters will ultimately end,
mostly for the same reasons as its predecessors. But the time needed to reach this
point depends also on the measures we collectively take in reacting to the phenom-
enon. A final new section in this update deals with these measures. Five policy
recommendations are suggested that might effectively contribute to countering the
current wave of foreign fighters – and protect a new generation from following suit.
Firstly, reframe the debate. Unless we understand how the motivations of the fourth
wave of foreign fighters essentially derive from a ‘no future’ subculture and not
simply from a narrative, prevention will fail. Secondly, focus on tailor-made
approaches. One-size-fits-all overall deradicalisation initiatives will be of marginal
use. Thirdly, separate the discussion on Islam in Europe from deradicalisation initia-
tives. The discussion on a ‘European Islam’ is a discussion worth holding for its own
merits, on its own terms, and with Muslims in the lead. It should not be pushed
within the deradicalisation framework. Not only will this not work as envisaged, it will
also harden positions, corrode an already fragile social fabric, and thus backfire.
Fourthly, don’t get terrorised by terrorists. Following the July 2005 bombings in
London, mayor Ken Livingstone reacted in simple and inclusive terms. Inclusiveness
is a tough thing to come by in today’s frenzied debates. Finally, invest in intelligence
(for a proper long-term perspective) and encourage short-term operational informa-
tion sharing.4
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVELooking for explanations for vicious behaviour doesn’t imply justifying it. The sole
responsibility for the violence perpetrated by foreign fighters are the foreign fighters
themselves. Each and every person is ultimately accountable for his or her actions.
But understanding the context is crucial if one is to devise adequate measures and
prevent yet another generation from becoming receptive to the siren songs of
extremist political violence.
Prof. dr. Rik Coolsaet1
March 2016
1 Rik Coolsaet is Professor of International Relations at Ghent University (Belgium) and Senior Associate
Fellow at the Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations (Brussels). He was invited to join the orig-
inal European Commission Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation (established 2006) and the subsequent
European Network of Experts on Radicalisation (ENER). Since 2003, he has been coordinating research on
terrorism and radicalisation, which resulted in several publications, including Jihadi Terrorism and the Radi-
calisation Challenge. European and American Experiences (Ashgate, 2011).5
INTRODUCTION
‘A bizarre phenomenon,’ Der Spiegel concluded, after trying to figure out why young
people left Germany to become foreign fighters in Syria. The magazine painted a
portrait of two thirty-somethings with similar backgrounds and the same hobby –
martial arts. One became director of a martial arts school in Hamburg, the other
became a terrorist poster boy in Syria.2
‘Bizarre’ wasn’t exactly the word former US Special Operations commander in the
Middle East, Major General Michael K. Nagata, used in a confidential memo in 2014.
But still, he too admitted to being puzzled by IS’ appeal: ‘We do not understand the
movement, and until we do, we are not going to defeat it. ... We have not defeated
the idea. We do not even understand the idea.’3
According to Americans estimates in the summer of 2015, IS (also known as ISIS, ISIL
and its Arabic acronym Daesh) in Syria and Iraq currently boasts about 28,000 foreign
fighters, who hail from 100 countries around the globe.4 The share of foreign fighters
within IS is said to represent at least 40%.5 Fighters from Middle Eastern countries
make up the largest contingent, but Europeans are well represented too. Europol
estimates the number of European nationals that have trained as foreign fighters in
Syria and Iraq at between 5,000 and 7,000.6
The first European to depart for Syria was probably a 28-year-old Frenchman who
joined the Free Syrian Army in March 2012. A month before, the Syrian city of Homs
had been shelled by the Syrian army. The Baba Amr district was the scene of
widespread fighting between al-Assad’s army and poorly organised rebel forces, with
hundreds of civilian deaths as a result. The Syrian civil war had begun.
Other Europeans soon followed suit. In the summer of that year, the first Belgians
arrived in Syria. Sean Pidgeon was the first to be killed, at 23 years old. He was born
into a Belgian-Congolese family from Laeken, a municipality of north-west Brussels,
and converted to Islam at age 14. He had left for Syria four months earlier. By March
2013, foreign fighters had become front-page news in Belgium (and the rest of
2 ‘Why young Germans are answering call to holy war’, in Der Spiegel, 28 November 2014. One examplar,
Denis Cruspert, who once called himself Deso Dogg (and later Abu Talha al-Almani), was reportedly killed in
a US air strike in Syria, mid-October 2015.
3 Quoted in New York Times, 29 December 2014.
4 www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-john-p-carlin-delivers-remarks-international-insti-
tute-justice.
5 Peter Neumann, Director of the UK Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), quoted in Alex Schmid,
Foreign (terrorist) fighter estimates: conceptual and data issues. The Hague, ICCT, Policy brief, October
2015, p. 2.
6 Europol’s director Rob Wainwright quoted by AFP, 15 December 2015 (available at: http://neurope.eu/
wires/the-latest-europol-estimates-5000-7000-european-foreign-fighters-trained-in-syria-or-iraq).7
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estimated 70 Belgian youngsters were then said to be in Syria. Almost all were
members of Sharia4Belgium, a neo-radical Islamist group created in early 2010 and
particularly active in Antwerp.7
The topic led to a media frenzy. Fear of attacks by returnees was a constant theme.
That led to hyperboles reminiscent of the immediate post-9/11 atmosphere. The
theme thus also reached the political agenda. In April 2013, the Belgian Interior
Minister Joelle Milquet hurriedly proposed a series of preventive and repressive
measures. In a parallel effort, mayors from cities that had seen tens of their young-
sters leave for Syria, such as Antwerp and Vilvorde, launched their own deradicalisa-
tion quest.
Terrorist incidents reached a crescendo following the shooting by Mehdi
Nemmouche in the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014. This was the first attack
in Europe linked to Syria. The Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015 and the subse-
quent police raid on a terrorist cell in Verviers (near Liège) that was on the verge of
perpetrating an attack on police premises (probably in the Brussels municipality of
Molenbeek, where they grew up) were the start of a year-long series of IS-linked
terrorist attacks and threats. In the mind of many, IS had by now replaced al-Qaeda
as the premium hydra-headed terrorist foe, surpassing the latter in scope and reach.
Trying to come to grips with the issue of youngsters leaving Belgium to join IS, all
levels of government in Belgium, from local to regional to national, hastily started to
devise deradicalisation programmes – but often without a great deal of coordination
and without evaluating what worked and what didn’t.
A series of deadly attacks in Paris in November 2015 and the identification of a
French-Belgian network linked to IS led to an international media campaign depicting
Brussels as a jihadi capital and a key staging ground for terrorist activities. A flurry of
arrests and house searches in November and December 2015 in several Belgian
cities, both in the north and the south of the country, as well as in Brussels, capped
a busy year for Belgian (and European) counterterrorism. Most of those arrested had
some link to Syria, thus emphasizing the threat emanating from Europeans – and
Belgians – leaving for Syria and possibly returning.
7 De Standaard (Belgian Dutch-language newspaper), 11 March 2013.8
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEThe Belgian numbers8
According to the most reliable public estimates, the number of Belgian
combatants in Syria and Iraq totals some 470 individuals as of January 2016.
Flanders and Brussels each account for some 45% of the departures, the rest
coming from the Walloon region.
Included in these figures are the 60 or so individuals who attempted to
voyage to Syria, but never made it. Almost a third (some 130) have now
returned, of which a third has been arrested and sent to jail. More than 80
have presumably been killed. About 190 are thus still active in Syria or Iraq
at the time of writing. Some of them have been on the battlefield for over
three years now. Of those whose affiliation could be established with a
degree of certainty, approximately 70% joined IS.
The departures from Belgium proceeded in phases. The first stage (between
April 2012 and July 2013) concerned a limited number of municipalities,
especially from Antwerp and Brussels, as well as Vilvorde. The second stage
(August 2013 to July 2014) saw an overall reduction in the number of depar-
tures (with the exception of Brussels), but the geographical scope started to
widen, as more municipalities were affected. Finally, from the summer of
2014 onwards, the number of departures further decreased, while some
new locations came up (Ghent in the north and Liège in the south of the
country). Overall, the monthly average of new departures has thus gradually
dropped from its peak of some 15 per month (in 2012-2013) to an average
of five per month in the year 2015.
The average age range of foreign fighters from Belgium is typically 20-24.
Almost all have Belgian nationality. For reasons explained below, Belgian-
Moroccans are significantly overrepresented among the Belgian Syria travel-
lers, accounting for up to four-fifths. In Belgium, converts are reported to
represent less than 10%.
Their educational level is below that of the average population. Syria travel-
lers with college degrees exist, but they constitute a small minority, as far as
Belgium is concerned. Most were known to police and intelligence before
their departure.
8 Interior Minister Jan Jambon to MP Koen Metsu (House of Representatives), Bulletin des Questions et
Réponses, House of Representatives, 11 January 2016, pp. 177-179. See also De Standaard, 20 January 2016
and La Libre Belgique (Belgian French-language newspaper), 22 January 2016. Additional sources: Jaak Raes
(head of the Belgian State Security Service), in Het Laatste Nieuws (Belgian Dutch-language newspaper), 15
May 2015; Interior Minister Jan Jambon in De Tijd (Belgian Dutch-language newspaper), 17 June 2015, and
on De Zevende Dag (Sunday television news program), 28 June 2015.9
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inherent difficulty of validating such numbers in war zones. Moreover, caution
should be taken when comparing numbers from different countries, since definitions
of what constitutes a foreign fighter and counting methods differ, even among EU
Member States. Nevertheless, Belgians are well represented in the ranks of IS. This
is often viewed as an indication that Belgium is being confronted with a significant
radicalisation challenge. When taking office in October 2014, the incoming Belgian
government stated in its coalition agreement: ‘The preservation of the democratic
system and the safety of our citizens are for the government an absolute priority.
Today, it is under pressure from a growing threat of radicalisation and terrorism.’ But
is it? Is radicalisation indeed at the root of today’s foreign fighters phenomenon, as
is claimed?10
THE ORIGINS OF A CONTESTED CONCEPT
More than a decade of research into radicalisation has resulted in a torrent of in-
depth studies, profiles and models aimed at conceptualizing the process by which an
individual turns into a terrorist. But when the scale of Europeans traveling to Syria
was disclosed in early 2013, many were nevertheless taken by surprise, even in
countries like the Netherlands or the United Kingdom, which had taken a substantial
lead in the field of radicalisation studies. By mid-2014, the Dutch intelligence service
AIVD consequently reported that the existing tools focusing upon profiles and indica-
tors had proven to be of only limited use.9 This observation should come as no
surprise. From its inception, the very notion of ‘radicalisation’ was an oversimplifica-
tion of an extremely complex phenomenon, but also a source of ambiguity and
confusion.
Even today, radicalisation remains ill-defined, complex and controversial.
The concept of radicalisation in relation to terrorism has no longstanding scientific
pedigree. It is a political construct that originated within European police and intelli-
gence circles shortly after the 9/11 attacks and appeared for the first time in EU
counterterrorism in May 2004. It was mentioned in an internal EU document listing
possible root causes, or underlying factors, that were considered conducive to the
recruitment of vulnerable individuals by foreign extremists. The attacks in Madrid
two months before and in London in July 2005 pushed the concept to centre stage in
EU counterterrorism thinking and policies. Untangling the process through which a
person turned from their ‘normal’ status into a terrorist became the core of radical-
isation studies and the holy grail of European (and later, worldwide) counterter-
rorism efforts.
But ‘radicalisation’ soon evolved into a catch-all concept, framed almost exclusively
in religious terms, and in this way opened wide the opportunity for pundits to equate
Islam with terrorism. Many different expressions of an individual’s ideas and behav-
iour were being labelled as signs of radicalisation, and these ranged from the
increased presence of girls and women wearing the hijab, men dressed in Salafi
trousers, orthodox preachers, and the terrorists themselves. Putting these disparate
signs together into a box labelled ‘indicators of radicalisation’ emptied the word of
all explanatory meaning, turning it into a container concept.
Because of its apparent simplicity, but also its ambiguity, it became entwined with
the public disenchantment over immigration that had developed since the 1980s,
and with the unease over Islam and Muslims boosted by the 9/11 attacks. Radicali-
9 The Transformation of Jihadism in the Netherlands. Swarm dynamics and new strength. The Hague, AIVD
(General Intelligence and Security Service), September 2014, p. 52.11
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from the anti-Islam rhetoric of right-wing pundits and movements. As a conse-
quence, radicalisation came to be seen as a unique contemporary process that was
linked almost exclusively to Muslim-related phenomena.
In 2004, the head of Scotland Yard’s counter-terrorism command, Peter Clarke, was
probably among the first officials to warn the media against labelling today’s main
terrorist threat as ‘Islamic’, since this was both offensive and misleading.10 But this is
exactly what happened. The concept was all the more tantalizing because of the
preexistent popular idiom: ‘radical Islam’11 and the ubiquity of the ‘clash of civiliza-
tion’ paradigm since 9/11.
Nevertheless, the myriad of radicalisation studies produced since 2004 has yielded
useful results. Radicalisation is first and foremost a socialisation process in which
group dynamics (kinship and friendship) are more important than ideology. These
studies have provided us with a more detailed understanding of the stages in this
process. Socialisation into extremism and, eventually, into terrorism, happens gradu-
ally and requires a more or less prolonged group process. Feelings of frustration and
inequity first have to be interiorised and then lead to a mental separation from
society (which is held responsible for those feelings). Individuals then reach out to
others who share the same feelings, and create an ‘in-group’. Within such a group,
personal feelings get politicised (‘what are we going to do about it?’). Groupthink
gradually solidifies into an unquestioned belief system and attitude, with alternative
pathways gradually being pushed aside. In this process, ideology helps to
dehumanise the outside-group and transforms innocents (who bear no responsibility
for the original feelings of frustration and inequity) into guilty accomplices. In this
process of gathering extremism, for most of the individuals involved, it is not the
narrative (i.e., the ideology) that eventually lures them into terrorism. There is
moreover no path dependency between the acquisition of radical ideas and the
actual turn to violence.
This process is neither clear-cut nor predictable, but messy and full of twists. Inter-
ventions aimed at deradicalisating an individual (shifting his mind-set) or even disen-
gagement (relinquishing violence) are not obvious nor easy, since they often leave a
crucial aspect out of the equation: the context. As Mark Sedgwick reminds us, ‘the
concept of radicalisation emphasizes the individual and, to some extent, the ideology
and the group, and significantly de-emphasizes the wider circumstances’ and the
context in which it arises.12 Post-2004 radicalisation studies tried to understand how
10 Quoted in The Guardian, 29 July 2005.
11 Fareed Zakaria, ‘The End Of The End Of History’, in Newsweek, 24 September 2001. See also: Christopher
Allen, ‘Justifying Islamophobia: A Post-9/11 Consideration of the European Union and British Contexts’, in
The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 2004, 21:3, pp. 1-25.
12 Mark Sedgwick, ‘The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion’, in Terrorism and Political Violence,
2010, 22: 4, pp. 480-481.12
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detrimental to the ‘why-terrorism-occurs approach’ advocated in terrorism research
since the 1970s. According to the latter approach, the causes of terrorism lie in a
conducive or ‘instigating’ environment that permits its emergence and that provides
motivation and direction for groups and individuals to use violence.13
After 9/11 however, context, preconditions and root causes took a back seat. The
‘how’ has become clearer, but the ‘why’ individuals and groups had (again) become
vulnerable to an extremist narrative went opaque. The complex interaction between
context, individual, and group processes was reduced to a question of narrative, with
(a ‘Salafist’ reading of) Islam being singled as the sole culprit – or root cause.
13 Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Causes of Terrorism’, in Comparative Politics, 1981, 13:4, pp. 379-399.13
(NOT) A NEW PHENOMENON
When defined as socialisation, ‘radicalisation’ is nothing new. Such processes led to
political violence and terrorism in the distant past too. Nor is it novel for Belgians
(and Europeans) to volunteer for foreign theatres of war. During the Spanish Civil
War, some 1,600 Belgian volunteers joined the International Brigades. Many more
joined the Waffen-SS and went to the Russian Front during the Second World War.
These are examples of bygone times.
From the 1980s onwards, a new generation of Europeans again started to join
foreign battlefields. The war against the Red Army in Afghanistan, the civil war in
Bosnia and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 attracted an unknown number of
volunteers from Belgium. The assassins that killed Commander Massoud in Afghani-
stan on the eve of 9/11 originated from Belgium. Ever since then, clandestine cells in
Belgium have facilitated the journey of volunteers to the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border area. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 marked a new uptick. The first Western
female suicide bomber in Iraq was 38-year-old Muriel Degauque, a Belgian convert
from Charleroi, who was killed in a suicide attack in November 2005.14
In 2008, a clandestine network centred around Malika al-Aroud was dismantled in
Belgium. It had been channelling fighters to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. By
then, the local jihadist scene was waning. It ‘consisted of a number of small
networks, which were relatively isolated and invisible.’15 The number of candidates
attempting to leave for foreign theatres was limited. Nevertheless, in Belgium and
elsewhere, chatter about leaving persisted, especially among youngsters, ‘but only a
handful ever put that wish into practice. And many of those attempts failed, due
either to their own ineptitude or to intervention by the AIVD, the Dutch judicial
authorities or their counterparts abroad. There was certainly no mass exodus to
theatres of jihad.’16
Four years later, the gridlock in the jihadist scene in Belgium (and elsewhere) came
to an abrupt end. Syria became a new magnet for foreign fighters, as Iraq had been
after 2003. And a new generation of activist groups linked the desire to leave with
the new theatre.
How to compare today’s European foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq with the jihadis
of past decades? Several characteristics seem to set them apart.
14 Chris De Stoop, a Belgian investigative journalist, has painstakingly reconstructed her journey in his Vrede
zij met u, zuster (Peace Be with You, Sister – Amsterdam, De Bezige Bij, 2010). It remains one of the best
available accounts of a ‘radicalisation process’. A French translation followed in 2013, La guerre sainte de
Muriel (Wavre, Editions Mols). Unfortunately, no English-language translation is available.
15 The Transformation of Jihadism in the Netherlands, p. 5.
16 Ibid.15
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average many years younger than their predecessors. The youngest Belgian who left
for Syria was only 13, and 15- to 18-year-olds are common throughout in Europe.
After 2001, the average age of European jihadi terrorists had been 27.7 years and the
typical age range 25-35.17 Nowadays, even if 30+ year-olds still make up a third of the
total number of Belgian foreign fighters, their average age is more likely to be close
to 20, and the age range of the foreign fighters from Belgium seems to be typically
20-24. On-going Dutch research also acknowledges 23.3 as the average age of the
segment of foreign fighters from Belgium whose birth date and moment of travel
could be determined with certainty (64 individuals).18 Cheikh Bassam Ayachi, the 68-
year-old Syrian-born head of a controversial Islamic Centre (Centre Islamique Belge,
CIB) in the Brussels municipality of Molenbeek, was probably the oldest to travel to
Syria, in December 2013.
The suddenness of their decision to leave for Syria is also a striking characteristic for
most of the youngsters (except for the first Belgian group in the summer and autumn
of 2012, comprising the core of Sharia4Belgium). Group dynamics play a crucial role,
since these youngsters meet and influence one another at school, in public parks,
sports clubs, or in the streets. But this is no longer linked to the more or less
protracted process of political radicalisation that was typical of the processes studied
in the past decade.
Information on foreigners joining the ranks of IS suggests that recruitment
can take place very quickly, without necessarily requiring a long radicalisation
process. Age plays a role: younger people are found to be more impression-
able and radicalise quicker than older candidates.19
Their acquaintance with religious thought is undoubtedly more shallow and superfi-
cial than their predecessors’, as is their acquaintance with international politics.
Geopolitics is less important to them than it once was to their predecessors, who felt
motivated by the struggle against the superpowers. Injustice was often a starting
point with their predecessors’ journey towards extremism and terrorism. This has
now largely been overshadowed by personal estrangement and motives as the
primary engines of their journey. Alain Grignard, Superintendent at the anti-terrorist
division of the Belgian Federal Judicial Police (Brussels), identifies the difference with
their predecessors as follows:
17 Edwin Bakker, ‘Characteristics of jihadi terrorists in Europe (2001-2009)’, in: Rik Coolsaet (ed.), Jihadi
Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge. European and American Experiences. Furnham, Ashgate, 2011,
p. 141; Richard Barrett, Foreign Fighters in Syria. New York, Soufan Group, June 2014.
18 My thanks goes to Roel de Bont and Arjen Brink (Leiden University), who made this information available
before their own research results were published. It is part of a larger research project, ‘Characteristics of
Jihadist Travelers to Syria in the Netherlands and Belgium’.
19 Changes in modus operandi of Islamic State terrorist attacks. Review held by experts from Member States
and Europol on 29 November and 1 December 2015. The Hague, Europol, 18 January 2016. Available at:
www.europol.europa.eu/content/ectc16
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEPreviously we were mostly dealing with ‘radical Islamists’— individuals radi-
calized toward violence by an extremist interpretation of Islam— but now
we’re increasingly dealing with what are best described as ‘Islamized radi-
cals’.20
Once in Syria and Iraq, they are very self-centred and cultivate the image they want
to display. Their yearning to place themselves at the centre of events (with numerous
selfies and social media posts on trivia like kohl make-up for boys and other teenage
themes) and their desire for attention reflect a degree of narcissism that was largely
absent among their older predecessors. Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the presumed ring-
leader of the 2015 succession of terrorist plots and attacks in France and Belgium,
dubbed himself a ‘terrorist tourist’ in a movie on his mobile phone, illustrated with a
series of selfies. ‘Being a radical is fun,’ according to a Belgian wannabe foreign
fighter, who had been in Syria for a couple of weeks.21 In this respect too, they do not
display the characteristics of religious fundamentalists, but of the very contemporary
selfie-generation of which they are part.22
Finally, the scale of the departures distinguishes the current foreign fighter phenom-
enon from its predecessors, straining the capabilities of police and intelligence. The
Dutch AIVD compared it to a ‘swarm’: highly decentralised, with numerous individual
and largely autonomous elements that collectively, however, maintain a cohesion
and direction: ‘In the absence of a strong hierarchy and leadership structure, the
main driving force within the movement is horizontal influence by friends, relatives,
neighbours and other like-minded individuals, in both the online and the offline
world.’ These characteristics prompted the AIVD to compare it with other contem-
porary mass social phenomena, which ‘through online hype, are able to trigger a
rapid mobilisation with an eventual offline impact’.23
20 Paul Cruickshank, ‘A view from the CT foxhole: An interview with Alain Grignard, Brussels Federal Police’, in
CTC Sentinel, 21 August 2015. Available at: www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-view-from-the-ct-foxhole-an-inter-
view-with-alain-grignard-brussels-federal-police.
21 De Morgen, 12 October 2015.
22 ‘The Me Me Me Generation’, in Time, 22 May 2013.
23 The Transformation of Jihadism in the Netherlands, op.cit., p. 24.17
THE FOURTH WAVE OF JIHADI TERRORISM
Based upon these characteristics, the current foreign fighter generation can be
considered a new wave in the history of jihadi terrorism. In his 2008 Leaderless Jihad,
the American scholar and former CIA case officer Marc Sageman identified three
successive waves starting in the 1980s.24 The first wave fought against the Soviets in
Afghanistan and became the comrades-in-arms of Osama bin Laden. They were very
much motivated by religious zeal. Surprisingly as it may sound, they often came from
a higher socio-economic status (upper and middle class). The second wave were
often elite expatriates from the Middle East who went to the West to attend univer-
sities. They joined al-Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Typically,
they had a middle class background. Motivated by the suffering of Muslims in Bosnia,
Chechnya, Kashmir, and the Philippines, they volunteered to fight in those hotspots.
On average, they were 30 years old when they took up arms.
The ‘glory days’ of al-Qaeda are situated between 1996 and 2001. By 2004-2005, the
first two waves of truly global jihadi travellers had reached their limits, due to the
killing and arrest of most of their members, the destruction of the training camps in
Afghanistan, but also to the growing awareness that, ultimately, most victims of
jihadi terrorism were Muslims. Global opinion polls showed the declining legitimacy
of jihadi terrorism, even if attacks by jihadi groups persisted.
But the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 breathed new life in the decaying jihadi
terrorist scene. A new wave of radicals emerged, angered by this invasion. This third
wave were labelled ‘home-grown’. Such bottom-up groups were also present in the
second wave, but they now became the dominant model. Since they couldn’t physi-
cally link up with the remnants of al-Qaeda or other jihadi organisations, they formed
bottom-up, fluid networks, that were self-financed and self-trained: ‘a leaderless
Jihad’, Sageman dubbed this wave. They entered the jihadi scene through kinship
and friendship bonds, and were often connected to the global context via the
internet, but were not able to physically link up with al-Qaeda training camps in
Afghanistan. Their motivations ranged from outrage about Iraq to thrill seeking and
a quest for a sense of significance and belonging in their lives.
In Europe, these radicals were often the children of migrants. They tended to have
middle to lower social class roots. Only very few had a religious background. Their
24 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad. Terror networks in the twenty-first century. Philadelphia, University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2008, pp. 48-50, 140 and passim. Olivier Roy uses a slightly different yardstick to iden-
tify successive waves. He merges Sageman’s second and third waves into one and emphasis the similarities
between this group and the current foreign fighters wave. See Olivier Roy, ‘Le djihadisme est une révolte
générationnelle et nihiliste’, in Le Monde, 24 November 2015 (translated into English by Foreign Policy, 7
January 2016).19
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEaverage age was about 20, according to Sageman. But the Dutch scholar Edwin
Bakker’s investigations (covering the 2001-2009 period) resulted in a higher average
age of 27.7 for the European wannabes.25 Bakker confirmed Sageman’s assessment
of the lower social class origins of the individuals in this wave and the high level of
unskilled or semi-skilled workers among them. At least a third of them, so Bakker
asserts, have a criminal record.
Boosted originally by the Iraqi invasion and fed by anti-Western sentiments, the third
wave of jihadi terrorism had run its course by 2008-2010, as related by the AIVD.26
Left to its own devices, without access to technical expertise, the fading of the
memories about the original anger caused by the Iraq war, as well as vigorous law
enforcement and intelligence efforts dismantled most of the clandestine groups.
The start of the civil war in Syria in 2012 and the emergence of potent jihadi groups
in the Levant, in particular IS, once again reinvigorated the waning jihadi movement.
It gave rise to a new, fourth wave of militants and wannabe foreign fighters. This
wave combines features of the past three waves with the aforementioned novel
characteristics, making it a distinct wave.
This fourth wave resembles its immediate predecessor by the local dynamics of its
networks. Nowadays too, they are formed among friends and family who have
known each other for years. This environment influences and shapes members’
behaviour and ideas. But, as mentioned above, these are on average even younger
than before and this translates into a specific, age-related set of personal motives. As
a result, the driving force behind their decision to go to the Levant is even less influ-
enced by religion or ideology, and even more by personal motivations and motives.
Religion has systematically decreased as a driver of violence as the waves of foreign
fighters unfolded. As of late, Europol has also recognised this development and
therefore suggested dropping the term ‘radicalisation’ altogether:
In view of this shift away from the religious component in the radicalisation
of, especially, young recruits, it may be more accurate to speak of a ‘violent
extremist social trend’ rather than using the term ‘radicalisation’.27
As will be explained below, ‘no future’ probably encapsulates best the subculture in
which the motives of the fourth wave of foreign fighters are rooted.
The opportunity to link up with one another on the battlefield as part of a conquering
terrorist and insurgent organisation, IS, is also distinct to the third wave. In this, it
25 Bakker, op.cit. An outstanding review of both Sageman’s and Bakker’s studies is provided by Simon Cottee,
who was probably the first to suggest the concept of ‘subculture’ as a way of grasping the foreign fighters
phenomenon. In ‘Jihadism as a subcultural response to social strain: extending Marc Sageman’s “bunch of
guys” thesis’, in Terrorism and Political Violence, 2011, 23:5, 730-751.
26 See notes 15 and 16.
27 See note 19.20
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEresembles the second wave. As a result, technical expertise can again be acquired
and skills transferred, in particular training with assault weapons. New networks of
personal inter-linkages will be established. The result was to be seen in the numerous
plots of 2015, that hint at an increasing interaction between grassroots and top-
down dynamics.
Mosaic of personal motives
What do we know about the motives and motivations of the fourth wave of (poten-
tial) foreign fighters originating from Belgium and Europe? Nowadays, the authori-
ties have at their disposal a wealth of raw data from different sources, even if these
are not always systematically compiled into analyses due to lack of time. Its volume
exceeds by far the available information on the earlier generations of foreign
fighters. A small part of this information surfaces during terrorism trials. In the (semi-
)public domain, social media is an important source, since it has been very widely
used by foreign fighters since 2012, including as a means of communication with the
home country (until IS tried to stem this and shifted to encryption apps).28
There are also the accounts of returnees who have been groping for answers about
the motivations that pushed them to leave for Syria, as well as interviews with those
still fighting there. Not all of these statements are equally straightforward or
unambiguous. Often, returnees themselves are unable to offer a satisfactory expla-
nation for their initial motives.29 Statements by combatants should be treated with
caution too. They might suffer from a mechanism similar to the well-known social
desirability gap that hampers survey-based research. The interviewee’s declarations
might amount to nothing more than a discourse developed to make sense of and to
justify their own behaviour, rather than a truthful attempt to gauge the often
complex motivations behind their decision to voyage to a distant war zone.
Still, some tentative conclusions can be drawn from these sources. At the risk of
excessive generalisation, but for the sake of clarity, two groups of Europeans travel-
ling to Syria can be distinguished. A first distinct group is composed of individuals that
might as well be (or are) part of ‘street gangs’. The second group is more fuzzy and is
composed of individuals with widely varying personal, age-related motivations.
IS super-gang
The first group is formed in the same way as their third wave predecessors in local
kinship and friendship networks, but now to an even larger extent in connection with
28 JTTM, Memri, 21 February 2015.
29 A poignant example is recounted by Sophie Kasiki in her Dans la Nuit de Daech (In the Night of Daesh). In
The Guardian, 9 January 2016.21
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEdrugs, petty crime and street violence. As a result, a noticeable number among them
have a criminal record.30 Alain Grignard described this group as:
‘to a significant degree, an extension of the ‘inner-city’ gang phenomenon.
Young Muslim men with a history of social and criminal delinquency are
joining up with the Islamic State as part of a sort of ‘super-gang’.’31
This corresponds to the background of many of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks
in Europe during the year 2015. ‘Gang of street thugs’ was an often heard depiction
former friends and neighbours offered of the group of young terrorists that perpe-
trated the November 2015 Paris attacks. Street gang dynamics and the fourth wave
of foreign fighters’ networks indeed offer a lot in common. Patterns of engagement,
age range, groupthink (by which members end up embracing the opinions of the
majority of the group), propensity for violence, and a feeling of having no stake in
society are all very similar.
Because of their difficulty of fitting into a (perceived) hostile society, they look for
alternative networks where they can blend in. Gang activities and the foreign
fighters’ undertakings alike are carried out on the margins of the local environment,
where they grew up. They create a parallel environment, based upon kinship and
friendship bonds, that provide them with support, protection, and shelter in case of
need.
According to the Danish sociologist Aydin Soei, author of Vrede unge mænd (Angry
Young Men, about the development of vulnerable neighbourhoods in Denmark from
the 1990s onwards), a 22-year-old gunman who killed two people in Copenhagen in
February 2015, was:
‘an exemplar of a phenomenon of Europe’s urban neighbourhoods, not a
product of the teachings of the Quran or their distortions by militant
preachers. [...] This wasn’t an intellectual Islamist with a long beard. ... This
was a loser man from the ghetto who is very, very angry at Danish society.’32
Going to Syria is one of a number of possible outlets for their anger. ‘Anger with an
Islamic dressing,’ the Dutch Middle East expert Paul Aarts opined.33
The Brussels municipality of Molenbeek too offers a case in point. More than a
decade and a half before it became a ‘global byword for jihadism’,34 it was the scene
of some widespread rioting (similar to the rioting in English or French suburbs). At
the time, the aforementioned Belgian investigative journalist Chris De Stoop
30 La Libre (Belgian French-language newspaper), 14 August 2015.
31 Paul Cruickshank, op.cit.
32 New York Times, 16 February 2015.
33 De Volkskrant (Dutch newspaper), 26 November 2013.
34 ‘A continent like Belgium’, in The Economist, 28 November 2015.22
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEattempted to gauge the malaise in this borough.35 He found a complex mosaic,
composed of vibrant local community activities, pockets of genuine despair and
accumulated frustrations, and cliques of troublemakers.
This rioting, according to a local social worker, was born out of desperation about
lacking prospects in a neighbourhood characterized by poor job prospects, bad
housing and deficient education. If we do not understand these root causes, we
doom the future of these kids, according to one of the local inhabitants: ‘These riots
indeed are very much a cry for help.’
The local police commissioner in turn recognised the increasing animosity between
his police officers (‘many of them displaying a negative attitude towards young
migrants’) and the local youth. Among them, he identified a rejectionist hard core, a
relatively small group, but one that displayed a perplexing ‘capacity to hate’, that
could be ‘exploited for other objectives’. Inequity also played a role in the anger, he
sensed and Chris De Stoop noted. Well-paid European officials within walking
distance with migrant families in decaying neighbourhoods cannot be but a recipe for
increased tension. The same applies to well-to-do ‘native’ Belgians who were
attracted to the municipality by its low rents, but whose arrival in turn boosted these
rents to levels difficult to pay by poor families.
Twenty-five years on, this portrayal is still valid.36 Molenbeek is neither the Bronx of
the 1960s and 1970s, nor a no-go zone or a HLM-ghetto. But since 1991, the density
of the population has significantly increased, while housing conditions and educa-
tion have worsened. A third and fourth generation are now growing up, the grand-
children of the ‘guest workers’ who had arrived in Belgium in the early 1960s. But it
still is a place where a lively local scene mingles with a wide variety of ‘street kids’,
who react in diverse ways to what they experience as a lack of prospects. A number
of them wallow in a self-image of a loser, exactly how the general public sees them.
As in 1991, a core among them has withdrawn into parallel worlds of illegal
economic activities and delinquency. They shelter in personal networks, where their
rejection of society is reinforced by their peers or kin, resulting in a real rupture with
society.
For this group, the outbreak of the civil war in Syria and the emergence of IS as the
primary jihadi group merely offered a new and supplementary channel for deviant
behaviour, next to membership of street gangs, rioting, drug trafficking, and delin-
quency. Interestingly, but underreported and thus insufficiently studied and
understood, is the parallelism between the age ranges (and the so-called ‘age-
crime curve’) of the criminal careers of Syria travellers and of juvenile criminal
35 Chris De Stoop, ‘Stad onder stroom’ [City Under Tension], in Knack (Belgian Dutch-language weekly), 22
May 1991. On the author, see note 14.
36 Hans Vandecandelaere, In Molenbeek. Antwerp, EPO, 2015, in particular pp. 173-185; Ine Renson, ‘Wij
vechten voor onze kinderen’, in De Standaard, 23 November 2015.23
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEoffenders.37 Joining IS is for a pre-existing kinship and friendship network a shift to
another form of deviant behaviour, but it adds and opens a thrilling, bigger-than-
life dimension to their way of life – indeed transforming them from delinquents
without a future into mujahedeen with a cause, at least as viewed by themselves.38
IS beckoning on the horizon
Whereas most individuals of the first group are known to the police, this is not neces-
sarily the case for the second group. Before suddenly deciding to leave for Syria,
alone or with friends and kin, the youngsters in this group didn’t show any sign of
deviant behaviour and nothing seemed to distinguish them from their peers. But
looking into the aforementioned stories, one cannot fail to notice how frequently
(potential) foreign fighters (or, more broadly speaking, Syria travellers) refer to the
absence of a future, and to personal difficulties they faced in their everyday life.
They often mention earlier personal difficulties (of various kinds), that left them
feeling stifled and discontented. Frequently, they express feelings of exclusion and
absence of belonging, as if they didn’t have a stake in society. One gets the impres-
sion of solitary, isolated adolescents, frequently at odds with family (‘my parents do
not understand me’) and friends, in search of belonging. The succession of such
estrangements then result at a certain point in anger.
Often these stories point to a desire to leave all this behind, to be ‘someone’, to be
accepted, to do something ‘useful’. In short, to find refuge in a more welcoming
environment, where they wouldn’t feel excluded, and where they would be able to
finally take control of their life.
They want to look up to heroes – or to be one themselves. According to Nazir Afzal,
the United Kingdom’s leading Muslim prosecutor, hundreds of British teenagers are
in danger of being radicalised by IS because they see the terrorists as ‘pop idols’:
The boys want to be like them and the girls want to be with them. ... That’s
what they used to say about the Beatles and more recently One Direction and
Justin Bieber.39
Some of them converted to Islam at a young age in order to find answers to questions
other value systems seemed unable to provide, or to bring sense and rules to what
they perceive as a seemingly meaningless life. The number of converts among the
Syria travellers differs significantly according to their home countries. Whereas the
37 Terrie E. Moffitt, ‘Adolescence-limited and life-course-persistent antisocial behavior: A developmental
taxonomy’, in Psychological Review, 1993, 100:4, pp. 674-701. I would like to express my gratitude to my
Ghent University colleague Lieven Pauwels for providing me with references on this topic.
38 Scott Atran and Nafees Hamid, ‘Paris: the war ISIS wants’, in New York Review of Books, 16 November 2015.
39 Quoted by The Guardian, 5 April 2015.24
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEAmerican contingent comprise approximately 40% of converts, according to a
scholar on US (counter)terrorism, Lorenzo Vidino,40 in Belgium only a tiny fraction
belongs to this group. France seems to be somewhere in between, with 25% of
converts, but increasing.41
The increasing number of girls and women travelling to Syria (sometimes with small
children) is also an illustration of this second group. In some countries their number
has increased more significantly than in others. In Belgium too, they have become
more prominent during 2015, albeit less so than in other countries, notwithstanding
the gruesome IS videos, the numerous accounts of cruelty, brutality and violence,
and the rumours about disillusioned fighters being executed by their fellow-fighters
in order to prevent them from going home. They are not incorporated into fighting
units, but perform logistic and support roles (including in a Western all-female police
brigade), or are confined to family life. Recently, complaints of rude behaviour of
male fighters towards women have become public.42
The foreign fighter phenomenon cannot be explained by mere socio-economic
profiles. For some time, terrorism research has indicated that neither poverty nor
socio-economic deprivation are direct root causes of terrorism. The pull of IS is not
limited to deprived neighbourhoods or to low-income families. Examples of
European foreign fighters originating from comfortable middle-class homes, with
college degrees or decent job prospects, abound. But it is obvious that the environ-
ment in which one grows up has an impact on the way the future is experienced. In
1990, French president François Mitterrand aptly made this point:
Que peut espérer une être jeune qui naît dans un quartier sans âme, qui vit
dans un immeuble laid, entouré d’autres laideurs, de murs gris dans un
paysage gris pour une vie grise, avec tout autour une société qui préfère
détourner le regard en n’intervient que lorsqu’il faut se fâcher, interdire?43
Common characteristics
The relative share of both groups may differ according to national backgrounds. In
the United States, the diversity of the current generation of foreign fighters is
‘staggering’, according to Vidino’s 2015 study. The same also seems to apply to the
United Kingdom. In Belgium the first group is comparatively overrepresented. But,
however different in background and motivations, both groups share some common
40 ISIS in America. From retweets to Raqqa. Washington, George Washington University, December 2015. See
also: Eric Schmitt, ‘ISIS followers in U.S. are diverse and young’, in New York Times, 1 December 2015.
41 Olivier Roy, op.cit.
42 Quoted in The Independent, 20 April 2015.
43 ‘What can a young person hope for when born in neighbourhood without a soul, living in a dreadful
building, surrounded by other dreadful things, grey walls in a grey landscape living a grey life, with all
around a society that prefers to look away and only intervene when it wants to show it is angry, and
wanting to prohibit?’ François Mitterrand, quoted in Le Monde, 5 November 2005.25
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEcharacteristics, that together constitute the subculture on which IS’ force of attrac-
tion thrives. In 2008, Marc Sageman suggested the concept of ‘jihadi cool’44 to
emphasise the force of attraction of jihadism to a wide range of young individuals.
Some years later, ‘pop-jihad as a lifestyle’ was coined by the Dutch Coordinator for
Security and Counterterrorism.45
Firstly, as Europol has now also concluded, religion is neither the key departure point
nor the primary engine of the ‘radicalisation’ of members of either group. According
to Marc Trévidic, a French judge specialised in anti-terrorism cases, jihadism has
become a ‘hype’ (‘un phénomène de mode’):
Ninety percent of those who leave, do it out of personal reasons: they are
looking for a fight, or for adventure, or revenge, because they do not fit in
society ... and only 10 percent out of religious beliefs. ... Religion is not the
engine of this movement and that’s precisely its strength.46
French Islam scholar Olivier Roy partly shares this assessment: ‘This is not the radi-
calization of Islam, but the Islamization of radicalism. ... [Today’s] terrorists are not
the expression of a radicalisation of the Muslim population, but rather reflect a
generational revolt that affects a very precise category of youth.’47
Most of them are not fundamentalists in the genuine sense of the word. Their
acquaintance with Islam is mostly superficial and often the Qur’an and the hadîth are
reduced to hollow slogans. They claim for themselves the right to interpret the
Qur’an as they see fit – instead of studying it over decades, as Islamic scholars have
been doing for centuries. In that sense, these European youngsters are the product
of the modern, individualistic world. They develop and display a self-constructed
discourse that is intended to give their conduct a semblance of justification and legit-
imation, at least in their own eyes. These mostly empty slogans are readily available
on the internet, or are picked up within the kinship and friendship groups where their
unease, frustration and discontent find an outlet. In August 2014, UK media reported
the case of two British youngsters, both 22, who had left Birmingham for Syria.
Before leaving, they had purchased Islam for Dummies and The Koran for Dummies.48
That is not altogether different from what happened within radical left groups in the
1960s and 1970s. Members of these groups often eagerly skipped Das Kapital and
confined themselves to the Little Red Book of Mao Zedong, or the then very popular
series of small Chilean booklets, written by Marta Harnecker, which explained
Marxism in simple terms.
44 Marc Sageman, op.cit., pp. 159-160.
45 De Volkskrant, 26 November 2013.
46 Le Télégramme (regional French newspaper), 25 June 2015 (www.letelegramme.fr/bretagne/le-juge-trev-
idic-la-religion-n-est-pas-le-moteur-du-jihad-27-06-2015-10682946.php).
47 Olivier Roy, op.cit.
48 New Statesman, 21 August 2014.26
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEThe lack of prospects, both real and perceived, is the second common characteristic.
The Syrian-born Abu Ibrahim, who worked in IS’ intelligence offices in Raqqa and Deir
Ezzor before fleeing the group, noticed also that religion was not the main engine for
most of the fighters he met, but desperation.49 More than any other reason, ‘no
future’ is the essence of the youth subculture that drives the majority of Syria travel-
lers from the West. Going to Syria is an escape from a life seemingly without
prospects.
As a consequence, they aspire to change the course of history by their actions. After
a short journey to Syria, Reda H. told the police how Abdelhamid Abaaoud had tried
to convince him to perpetrate an attack in his home country. According to Reda H.,
Abaaoud was convinced that ‘in case many civilians were killed, France’s foreign
policy would change as a result.’50 Being able to surf on the wings of history explains
the force of attraction of the apocalyptic, end-times prophesies upheld by IS.
Thirdly, as Olivier Roy also argues, the subculture is also the result of an adolescents’
revolt against their parents, their environment and against society and authorities.
Up to a point, the very same mechanisms were at play during the protest movements
of the 1960s and the 1970s, when parts of the younger generation also rebelled
against society, to the bewilderment of their parents, who couldn’t comprehend
their youngsters’ discontent. Their rebellion must have appeared as ‘bizarre’ to their
parents and as difficult to comprehend as today’s foreign fighter phenomenon, to
use Der Spiegel’s phrase. With hindsight, we now know that the 1960s-1970s sprang
from the specific features of society at that time.
But society today significantly contrasts with society back then.
49 Vera Mironova, Ahmet Mhidi and Sam Whitt, ‘The jihadi who came in from the cold’, in Foreign Policy, 10
August 2015.
50 Quoted in Le Monde, 6 January 2016.27
PUSH FACTORS: A CONDUCIVE ENVIRONMENT, 
A YOUTH SUBCULTURE AND MANY PERSONAL MOTIVES
The most obvious transformation since the 1960s and 1970s is the considerably
greater pressure society today puts upon young people. Individualisation and the
lifting of traditional political, religious and ideological fault lines leave youngsters
much earlier to their own devises and exposed to society than their peers back then.
Adolescents’ and young adults’ need to belong and feel accepted has always been a
crucial part of growing up. But, at a much earlier stage than in the past, today’s young
people have to make their own decisions in a society that offers incomparably more
choices in all dimensions of life. Simply put, it’s more demanding to be young today
than it was back then. Society has become harsher, as experienced by Pupil Guidance
Centres in Belgium, community teams of doctors, nurses, social workers, psycholo-
gists and pedagogues that work with schools: ‘Increasingly, young people feel side-
lined, or lose their grip on the situation. In kindergarten already, you hear: ‘They can’t
cope with it.’’51
‘Teenage angst’52 is probably an apt label to describe how it feels to grow up in an
environment that has become very complex, with few benchmarks and points of
reference, as a result of the dynamics of globalisation and the post-industrial revolu-
tion. And on top of this, the future doesn’t look bright: ‘The generation coming of age
in the 2010s faces high unemployment and precarious job situations, hampering
their efforts to build a future and raising the risk of social unrest.’53
Secondly, pessimism rules today. All European countries have been increasingly
under the spell of pessimism, according to the European Social Survey and other
surveys. According to Roger Liddle, former advisor to European Commission Presi-
dent Jose Manuel Barroso, ‘we may be the first generation since the great advance
of material progress which began with the industrial revolution that believes life will
not be as good for our children and grandchildren as it has been for us.’54 The
economic and financial crisis has further eroded confidence in the future.
So in brief, not only is growing up more demanding for youngsters than it used to be,
the current pessimistic outlook also stands in stark contrast to the optimistic zeitgeist
of the 1960s and 1970s, when the horizon looked bright, activism thrived, and radical
51 De Standaard, 8 November 2014.
52 The Dutch novelist Abdelkader Benali used this label in a poignant reflection on the Charlie Hebdo attack:
‘From Teenage Angst to Jihad. The Anger of Europe’s Young Marginalized Muslims’, in New York Times, 13
January 2015.
53 Global Risks 2014. Geneva, World Economic Forum, 2014, p. 10.
54 Roger Liddle, Social Pessimism. The New Social Reality of Europe. London, Policy Network, October 2008.29
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEchanges for the better appeared to be within reach. Where pessimism rules, ideals
die, resignation is omnipresent, and the energy to strive for change fades away.
Belgium offers a case in point. Surveys reveal that pessimism is particularly ambient
in the country. In 2012, 70% of the Belgian population responded that future
prospects looked dim, which represented an increase of nearly 15% in six years.
Southern European countries (and Ireland) then showed a still greater jump in the
rate of pessimism.55 According to the 2014 Gallup End of Year Survey, however,
Belgium was by far the most pessimistic (with only Italy slightly more pessimistic).
The survey showed that globally approximately half (53%) of those asked about 2015
thought it would be better than 2014 (which was up by 5% from last year). In
Belgium, however, only a fifth (19%) were optimistic about the new year, whereas
40% thought it would be worse. This Belgian pessimism score is surprisingly high in
comparison to the European average of 26%.56
Youth representatives in Belgium consequently warn that many young people are
depressed and feel hopeless. The enduring economic and labour market stagnation
is certainly part of the explanation for why youngsters today have the impression
that they are just fiddling around without decent job prospects.57 The youth suicide
rate (for 15-24 year-olds – broadly, the same age range as the foreign fighters) is
much higher and has declined less in Belgium than in most other EU Member States.
Dropping out of school also appears to be more prevalent in Belgium than in neigh-
bouring countries. A recent OECD study confirms this Belgian particularity. A growing
group of Belgian youngsters (15-29 year-olds) are neither in employment nor in
education or training and have no diploma. This represents almost a fifth of all
youngsters in Belgium. That is not only higher than the EU average, but also signifi-
cantly higher than in neighbouring countries.58
Thirdly, inequalities have been increasing In European societies over the past few
decades. The 1991 reporting on Molenbeek59 already observed that inequalities
have a built-in capacity to potentially raise social tensions.
Socio-economic inequality is one of them. Unfortunately, Belgium once more offers
a case in point. Jozef De Witte, former director of the Belgian Equal Opportunity
Centre, was the first to establish a link between the number of Belgian foreign
fighters and structural inequalities in their home country:
55 Dirk Tirry e.a., Tien jaar ‘European Social Survey’. KULeuven, Sociology Department, 2014, pp. 28-29.
56 http://www.wingia.com/web/files/richeditor/filemanager/Belgium_Tables_V3_a.pdf. The 2015 Gallup
Survey again confirmed the pervasive pessimism in Belgium. The country ranked third among the most
pessimistic European countries behind Italy and Greece.
57 Brussel Deze Week (local Brussels weekly), 13 November 2014.
58 Education at a glance 2015. Paris, OECD, 2015, pp. 378 (table C5.2a).
59 See note 35.30
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEIn Belgium, the gap between natives and immigrants (from outside the EU) in
terms of employment and education is higher than anywhere else in Europe.
Add to that, the statements made by Filip Dewinter [a leader of the main
radical right party in Belgium] and others and you get barrels full of frustration
looking for an outlet. How many people realize that half of our Moroccan
community lives in poverty – compared to 15% of the Belgians without migra-
tion background. Yet, one cannot detect any sense of urgency among our
decision-makers.60
Other examples and numbers can be quoted, but the point is that in Belgium, citizens
with a non-European family background are overrepresented in the lower rungs of
most socio-economic categories (unemployment, housing, health, education).
Compared to their peers, youngsters in this group are confronted with a number of
real obstacles, in particular discrimination on the job and the real estate market, and
educational deficiencies. As was already noted a decade ago, within migrant commu-
nities despair, discouragement, and even fear about their youngsters’ chances of
overcoming these situations in the foreseeable future, has been prevalent for some
time now.61
With the economic and financial crisis starting in 2008, job prospects became even
dimmer for individuals with few qualifications, who have to wait much longer before
finding a job than their peers with diplomas. Again, non-Europeans in Belgium carry
the heaviest burden: they are overrepresented in vulnerable and ill-paid temporary
jobs. In 2015, the assessment by the Belgian Ministry of Social Security of the
dramatic situation in the job market was beyond dispute: ‘Regarding the socio-
economic position of persons with a migrant background, Belgium is among the
worst performing EU Member States.’62
Educational segregation is considered one of the main culprits for this dramatic
Belgian (but also French) situation, according to the OECD. A disproportionately large
share of pupils with a migration background are shunted into ‘concentration schools’
(schools with a high percentage of non-native pupils) in cities like Brussels, where
unemployment rates among non-Europeans are already sky-high.63 Poverty rates
among unqualified workers has dramatically increased between 2005 and 2014,
while decreasing among the qualified, with a growing social divide between Belgians
with or without qualifications as a result, according to the aforementioned assess-
ment of the Belgian Ministry of Social Security.
60 De Morgen, 30 September 2014.
61 Rik Coolsaet, Between al-Andalus and a failing integration. Europe’s pursuit of a long-term counterterrorism
strategy in the post-al-Qaeda era. Ghent/Brussels, Academia Press/Egmont, Egmont Paper 5, 2005, p. 11.
62 http://socialsecurity.belgium.be/sites/default/files/analysis-social-situation-and-protection-belgium-2015-
synthesis-en_0.pdf.
63 www.skolo.org/IMG/pdf/dossier_pisa_fr.pdf.31
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVESocio-economic inequality is indeed intertwined with a rising socio-cultural
inequality in Europe. A new fault line has developed between people who have
enjoyed higher education and people without such qualifications. With a certain
sense of cultural superiority, the former tend to look down at the latter. Both groups
moreover tend to live in ‘relatively separate worlds’. Urban segregation based upon
wealth is increasingly a reality on the ground in Europe.64
Fourthly, an additional factor of potential estrangement puts pressure on a very
precise segment of youth in Europe, and in Belgium. Exactly 30 years ago, the French
weekly Figaro Magazine featured the portrait of a veiled Marianne to illustrate the
cover story: ‘Serons-nous encore Français dans trente ans?’ (‘Will we still be French
30 years from now?’). The children and grandchildren of the migrant workers that
Belgian (and other European) authorities invited to come en masse in the 1960s to
compensate for domestic labour shortages are still being confronted on a daily basis
with their origins. They are still routinely labelled ‘migrant communities’ – notwith-
standing the fact that these families have now been present on European soil for
three or four generations, and that many of them have acquired Belgian (or other
European) nationality.
After 9/11, it became standard practice to equate ‘immigrant’ with ‘Muslim’. The
significant diversity within diasporic communities from Muslim-majority countries
was thus compressed into a single monolithic category labelled ‘Muslim community’,
conflating ethnicity with religion.
This is part of the European variety of identity politics the world has been experi-
encing since the 1990s:
New today is the rise of identity politics. In vastly different contexts and in
different ways – from indigenous people in Latin America to religious minori-
ties in South Asia to ethnic minorities in the Balkans and Africa to immigrants
in Western Europe – people are mobilizing anew around old grievances along
ethnic, religious, racial and cultural lines, demanding that their identities be
acknowledged, appreciated and accommodated by wider society. Suffering
discrimination and marginalisation from social, economic and political oppor-
tunities, they are also demanding social justice. ... Why these movements
today? They are not isolated. They are part of a historic process of social
change, of struggles for cultural freedom, of new frontiers in the advance of
human freedoms and democracy. They are propelled and shaped by the
spread of democracy, which is giving movements more political space for
protest, and the advance of globalisation, which is creating new networks of
64 Gescheiden werelden. Een verkenning van sociaal-economische tegenstellingen in Nederland [Worlds apart.
A survey of socio-economic fault lines in the Netherlands]. The Hague, The Netherlands Institute for Social
Research, 2014, pp. 16, 203 and 228. See also: Tiit Tammaru, et.al., Socio-economic segregation in Euro-
pean capital cities. London, Routledge, 2016.32
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEalliances and presenting new challenges. ... These struggles over cultural iden-
tity, if left unmanaged or managed poorly, can quickly become one of the
greatest sources of instability within states and between them – and in so
doing trigger conflict that takes development backwards. Identity politics that
polarize people and groups are creating fault lines between ‘us’ and ‘them’.65
For the children and grandchildren of the 1960s and 1970s migrants, one way of posi-
tioning themselves in times of enhanced identity politics has been to emphasise the
religious affiliation that society constantly throws in their face.66 As a result of this,
some think of themselves as Muslims first rather than as citizens of their country.67
‘Proud to be a Muslim’ became the theme in lyrics and Facebook accounts. It is easy
to compare this development with the 1960s ‘Black-is-beautiful’ movement in the
United States. Around 2008, a ‘Cool Islam’ movement emerged, developing into a
youth subculture with its own rap, designer clothes and magazines.68 Those who
could afford it started to look for opportunities to emigrate to more welcoming
places, like Montreal or New York.69 But many more don’t have the means to embark
on such a journey.
It is extremely difficult to comprehend the impact four decades of political, media
and social misgivings that one section of European citizenry has had to endure,
whether or not they are highly qualified. The sense of inequity that results from this
is a breeding ground for frustration and anger. ‘Before, I used to be really mad.
Because I was not happy. Because it felt like I was stuck. I would end up as a third-
rate film director shooting wedding parties for the rest of my life. I felt as if I was less
than nothing. I think that all adolescents have to go through that phase. But perhaps,
it depends. If you’re a super well-developed, gorgeous rich guy who is being watched
by all the girls, then you might be less pissed at the world,’ the successful Belgian
movie director Adil El Arbi once quipped.70
Struggling with identity and self-image might have been demanding for youngsters
since time immemorial, but society today is demanding, complex, and increasingly
unequal. Belgium was once lauded for the way Islamic teaching was organised in the
country and therefore considered as a model by Muslim communities in other EU
Member States.71 But this hardly made Belgium a model for the integration of
65 Human Development Report 2004. Cultural Diversity in today’s diverse world. Washington, UNDP, 2004, pp.
1-2.
66 Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims in the EU. Developments since September 2001. Helsinki,
International Federation for Human Rights, March 2005, p. 12.
67 Muslims in Europe. Pew Global Attitudes Project, 6 July 2006.
68 Maruta Herding, Inventing the Muslim Cool: Islamic Youth Culture in Western Europe. Bielefeld, Transcript,
2013.
69 Nadia Fadil, in De Morgen (Belgian Dutch-language newspaper), 15 April 2013.
70 De Standaard Weekblad, 8 November 2014.
71 Intolerance and discrimination against Muslims in the EU. Developments since September 11. Vienna, Inter-
national Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, March 2005, pp. 23 and 39-48.33
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEnewcomers. ‘Assimilation, for a Belgian with non-European roots, is a near-impos-
sible task,’ Chika Unigwe wrote. Married to a Belgian and naturalised Belgian, the
author of the novels On Black Sisters Street and Night Dancer was astonished to
discover how non-natives are constantly being confronted with their ethnic (or
religious) origins, even if they are born in the country.72
(Great) grandchildren of migrants from the 1960s, born and raised in Belgium, are
still being labelled by the ethnic origin of their grandparents. It should thus come as
no surprise that the Eurobarometer survey identifies Belgium among the top five EU
Member States where discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin is considered
widespread (together with the Netherlands, Sweden, France and Denmark).73
Compared to European averages, Belgium also has a poor track record in many socio-
cultural and socio-economic categories. None of them taken in isolation explains the
motives behind a departure to Syria. But these things add up. Perhaps this combina-
tion of (perceived) lack of prospects and a less than welcoming environment comes
closest to identifying a significant, but often neglected, feature contributing to the
‘no future’ subculture that is the main driver of the comparatively high number of
Belgian youngsters leaving for Syria.
This demanding social environment is especially strongly felt among Belgian-
Moroccan families. These are indeed the most exposed and vulnerable to the
complex mosaic of overlapping pressures in today’s society. Religion, once again, has
nothing to do with this. While the Belgian-Turkish community (itself no monolith)
possesses a network of self-organisations, the Belgian-Moroccan community is much
more fragmented and individualised, thus offering less shelter. The latter is also
more concentrated in the most disadvantaged city districts. Combining all these
elements, the children (and grandchildren) of the Moroccan migrants of the 1960s
and 1970s are more likely to face downward mobility than their Belgian-Turkish
peers. Research has made it clear that feelings of exclusion are significantly more
prevalent among the Belgian-Moroccan youngsters (the same is also the case in the
Netherlands).74 The disappointment of not being recognised and accepted as equal
citizens is thus powerfully felt among Belgian-Moroccan youngsters, more so than
among their peers with Turkish roots. The latter enjoy more opportunities for
upward mobility within Belgian-Turkish networks.75
72 Chika Unigwe, ‘The near-impossibility of assimilation in Belgium’, in New York Times, 25 November 2015.
73 Eurobarometer 437, October 2015 (http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/
Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/yearFrom/1973/yearTo/2015/surveyKy/2077).
74 Kris Vancluysen a.o., Gekleurde steden. Autochtonen en allochtonen over samenleven [Coloured Cities].
Brugge, Vandenbroele, 2009; Mieke Maliepaard and Mérove Gijsberts, Moslim in Nederland 2012 [Muslims
in the Netherlands]. The Hague, The Netherlands Institute for Social Research, November 2012, p. 20.
75 Corinne Torrekens and Ilke Adams, Belgo-Marocains, Belgo-Turcs: (auto)portrait de nos concitoyens. Brus-
sels, King Baudouin Foundation, May 2015, pp. 166, 168, 178-179 and 212.34
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEHence it will come as no surprise that youngsters with Moroccan roots are overrep-
resented in the ranks of the foreign fighters from Belgium.
This fault line between society and part of the younger generation is barely acknowl-
edged by mainstream politics, and is overshadowed by the reductionist debate on
the compatibility of Islam with Western values. In the parliamentary debates in
Belgium following the Charlie Hebdo attacks and the subsequent events in Verviers,
the argument has been advanced that ‘society cannot be blamed for radicalisation’,
or ‘the constitutional state guarantees equal rights for every one’. Unfortunately,
this is not being perceived the same way by at least a number of youngsters. Some
no longer believe in equal opportunities. Some do not have the impression that they
are confronted with a multitude of choices in all dimensions of life, as mentioned
above. Quite the contrary. They feel as if they have ‘no future’ as their horizon. They
face an impasse and nobody seems be able to get them out of it. ‘Un sentiment
d’abandon’ (‘a feeling of abandonment’), was the prevailing emotion Latifa Ibn
Ziaten, the mother of one of the soldiers killed by Mohammed Merah in 2012, had
sensed when speaking at schools in the French cités.76
From social environment to personal motives
Undoubtedly, this social environment is a difficult burden to carry for youngsters as
a group, but it is even harder to cope with if one has the impression of not being able
to enjoy the same opportunities as one’s peers. And it is still harder for those for
whom this is not merely a feeling but a reality, because they live in difficult circum-
stances in urban neighbourhoods where prospects of decent work are hard to come
by.
Research has over and again indicated that mere socio-economic profiles prove
insufficient as an explanation for terrorism. A number of European foreign fighters
have college degrees. They do not all come from deprived neighbourhoods, nor did
they all face a precarious socio-economic and professional situation. But in Belgium,
a majority nevertheless does. Especially at the beginning, the bulk of the individuals
going to Syria originated from a limited number of disadvantaged inner-city
boroughs. No comprehensive analysis of the socio-economic background of Belgian
foreign fighters has yet been produced, but the available information indicates that
a majority of them were moreover facing personal difficulties (including strained
family relations, psychosocial hardship, early encounters with policing and justice).
Even Syria travellers who were born in families without financial strains but living in
depressed city districts were thus immersed in the ambient ‘no future’ atmosphere,
through the dynamics of local friendship networks.
76 http://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-divers/terrorisme/le-message-de-paix-de-latifa-ibn-ziaten_826641.html.35
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEThis background overlaps with the Dutch foreign fighter contingent. A study of 140
actual and potential Syria travellers, as compiled by the Counterterrorism and
Extremism team in the Central Unit of the Dutch National Police, reveals a compa-
rable environment. Many of them showed signs of previous problematic and/or
deviant behaviour (including personality disorders), came from broken families and
had experienced domestic violence. The educational level was below that of the
average population (none had a completed higher education) and, if employed, they
were mainly in irregular jobs. In brief, ‘males with immigrant and socially vulnerable
backgrounds dominate the sample’.77
In the case of Belgium and the Netherlands, the predominantly lower class
background of the fourth wave foreign fighters is thus similar to that of their third
wave predecessors.
But IS’ pull is broader, attracting members of inner-city gangs with a propensity for
violence and deviant behaviour, as well as youngsters who simply no longer feel
connected to society, the less well-off as well as the better-off. The perceived lack of
prospects provides the conducive environment for the wide array of personal, age-
related motivations through which a youngster may be tempted by an escape to
Syria. Posts on social media refer to Tupac Shakur, icon of American gangsta rap, shot
in 1996.78 At least some of the Belgian (and European) foreign fighters identify with
his life and his rap lyrics, which indeed seem to fit well into the world outlook of this
group. The foreign fighter phenomenon is rooted in a specific youth subculture that
has developed in reaction to an environment young people feel and perceive as
complex, demanding, unjust. They feel as if they don’t have a stake and a place in
that society. The ambient pessimism leaves no place for any hope for improvement
and the resignation of their parents to this state of affairs is for some of them a
supplementary factor in their decision.
But complementary motives can also play a role, and sometimes a major one. At the
outbreak of the civil war in Syria in particular, ideological extremism and anger at the
indifference of the international community to the plight of the Syrian population
have been motives for a number of them. More malicious motives have been at play
too: some hope to evade prison sentences by fleeing to Syria. Others display a ‘jihadi
is cool’ attitude, or are animated by Rambo-style violence. ‘They’ve watched too
many Rambo movies,’ a Syrian activist in Kafr Nabl stated to the New York Times.79
Some are undeniably psychopaths, while still others are adventure-seekers, looking
for something more thrilling than everyday life in Belgium.
77 Anton W. Weenink, ‘Behavioral Problems and Disorders among Radicals in Police Files’, in Perspectives on
Terrorism, 2015, 9:2 (www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/416/html).
78 Amil Khan, ‘Al Qaeda’s New Front: Jihadi Rap,’ in Politico, 31 August 2014; Der Spiegel, op.cit. Kevin Powell
gives a detailed account of the life and work of Tupac Shakur in ‘Bury me like a G: The short life and violent
death of Tupac Shakur’, in Rolling Stone, 31 October 1996.
79 New York Times, 4 December 2014.36
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEThe fourth wave of foreign fighters is thus not about radicalisation, as is often touted
by authorities and the media. Neither is it rooted in a fundamentalist reading of the
scriptures. It originates in a small subculture at the margins of society and of Muslim
communities with whom they do not feel connected either. For most of them it is
about personal motives, as Marc Trévidic wrote. It is tantamount to escaping from an
unappealing everyday life and turning their back on a society to which they no longer
feel connected.
Syria provides them with an opportunity.37
PULL FACTORS: WHY SYRIA – AND WHY IS?
Much more than the ‘old’ al-Qaeda, IS has become the object of all kinds of fantasies
for all kinds of people, from thrill-seekers to the mentally unstable, who all want to
be part of IS because it offers them a once in a lifetime, instant opportunity to go
from ‘zero to hero’ in their own eyes.
The gravitational pull of IS stems from its unique combination of facilitating factors.
Geography is one of them. Syria is easily accessible, especially for youngsters, in compar-
ison to the earlier jihadi war zones. Hence it offers the opportunity that had been lacking
for candidate foreign fighters since 2010. Rapidly, ISIS became a real magnet, attracting
the bulk of foreign fighters. It was the direct successor to an earlier, also extremely
brutal, terrorist movement in Iraq founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in response to the
US invasion. Notwithstanding the name it adopted by late 2004 (‘al-Qaeda in the Land
of the Two Rivers’, later rebranded as ‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’), the relationship between al-
Zarqawi’s group and al-Qaeda itself often was tense, at times even antagonistic. Both
organisations differed on tactics, strategy and personal ambitions.
On 29 June 2014, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of
a caliphate. ISIS morphed into ‘Islamic State’ (IS) – or Daesh, its Arabic acronym.
The rapid ascent of IS made it the most successful of all current jihadist groups. The
impression of irresistible expansion since January 2014 undeniably increased its
appeal to potential volunteers. Its 24-hour online operation, but also the hyperboles
used in the Western media and in political discourse emphasizing the existential
threat that IS was said to represent to the West, reinforced among Western youths
its appeal as a movement of winners. Winners attract winners.
But most importantly, it has a catalogue of solutions on offer for each of the personal
motives the potential volunteers bring with them. IS seemingly offers a future,
prospects and a feeling of finally being able to take control of their destiny. It
suggests to them empowerment, belonging, warm camaraderie, respect, recogni-
tion, adventure, heroism and martyrdom.
Having turned his back on IS, Abu Ibrahim (who is mentioned above, and was associ-
ated with IS’ intelligence offices) mentioned that the thing he enjoyed most in Daesh
was the friendship between fighters. There were groups of Americans, French and
Arabs, but they really cared about each other, and there was no discrimination, at
least according to his account. But at the same time, he could not but notice how the
group’s fighters – especially the foreigners – dealt with local people as if they were
the lowest possible class.80
80 Vera Mironova, et.al, op.cit.39
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEIS projects a new Utopia of peace, harmony and universal brotherhood, a potent
alternative to a life of drugs and petty crime, with simple and straightforward rules.
Moral absolutes have always attracted adolescents and this is also exploited by IS –
not only in words and discourse, but also by acts: destroying ancient monuments and
relics strongly appeals to those who want a clear and absolute break with all things
past, in order to create a brand-new world imagined as a recovered, righteous
caliphate.81
IS furthermore offers material wealth: a salary and a villa with a pool.82 It offers, for
those who join in, power over others, and even a license for viciousness83 in the
name of a higher goal.
Last but certainly not least, IS’ solutions are all the more credible, since they are
presented as within immediate reach, thanks to IS’ seizure of large chunks of terri-
tory in Iraq and Syria. Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda was never in a position to offer
this. Nowadays, al-Qaeda resembles a small elitist vanguard group, whereas IS has
ambitions to become a broad, mass movement.
The strength of this pull factor is intimately linked to the maintenance of territorial
and virtual progress, IS’ aura of invincibility and the sense of inevitable victory within
reach. For that reason, IS needs to use all means available to stay in the media
spotlight and to remain at the centre of international and regional political discourse.
To that end, it will pursue its brutal tactics, considering it the best propaganda for
enticing new volunteers. IS will remain a magnet until its momentum has passed and
its winner’s image crumbles.
Time, however, works against IS. Its spread has been stymied in Syria and its military
capabilities degraded by incessant bombings. Turkey is tightening its border with
Syria. The organisation has been dislodged from the Iraqi cities of Ramadi, Baiji and
Tikrit, and the operation to oust IS from Mosul will be launched in the first half of
2016. As was the case with al-Qaeda,84 IS’ legitimacy will undoubtedly decrease as a
result of its brutal tactics, but also of the realisation that Muslims themselves are
again the principal victims of IS’ actions. A recent poll indicated that the Arab world
as a whole is overwhelmingly opposed to IS, with 89% of respondents stating that
they have negative views of the group, compared to only 7% of Arabs who view the
extremist organisation positively.85
81 Ian Morris, ‘The struggle for soft power in the Middle East’, in Stratfor, Global Affairs, 9 September 2015.
82 New York Times, 16 June 2015.
83 C.J. Chivers, ‘Behand the Black Flag: The Recruitment of an ISIS killer’, in New York Times, 20 December
2015.
84 Islamic terrorism: common concern for Muslim and Western publics. Washington, Pew, 14 July 2005 (http:/
/pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/248.pdf). Ipsos-Stat conducted a survey in Jordan after the November 2005
Amman attacks. For results see: http://www.alghad.jo/index.php?news=56817
85 Arab Opinion Index 2015, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 21 December 2015 (http://
english.dohainstitute.org/content/cb12264b-1eca-402b-926a-5d068ac60011).40
LINKING PUSH AND PULL FACTORS: THE ROLE OF 
SHARIA4BELGIUM AND ALLIES
The comparatively high number of Syria travellers originating from Belgium is
undoubtedly also the result of the presence of a number of small extremist groups
that played the unique role of hyphen between push and pull factors in the early
stages of the Syrian crisis. In Belgium, this refers in particular to Sharia4Belgium
(S4B), Resto du Tawhid in Schaerbeek (where Sean Pidgeon volunteered), and the
members of the old GICM cell (Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain) in Maaseik,
once they were released from prison. The leaders of these groups were themselves
interlinked and on average older than the rest of the members of these groups.
The crucial role played by such groups in the current foreign fighters phenomenon
becomes clear when examining the places of origin of the individuals who left for
Syria in the first phase of departures. Most came from urban neighbourhoods where
these groups had been most active, such as Antwerp, Vilvorde and the Brussels
municipalities of Schaerbeek, Laeken, and Molenbeek. Moreover, peer pressure
played a decisive role in this first phase. One had no choice but to join in, going to
Syria being considered ‘hot’.
When sentencing Sharia4Belgium figurehead Fouad Belkacem in February 2012, the
Antwerp court emphasised how the discourse of Belkacem had become ‘increasingly
provocative and violent’ since the creation of the organisation in early 2010. Some of
the core group travelled to the Middle East (Lebanon) as early as 2010 for ideological
and physical training, according to the verdict in the subsequent February 2015
Sharia4Belgium trial. This indicates a deliberate strategy by the groups’ leaders –
years before the start of the civil war in Syria – to use groupthink to mould the minds
of those involved towards participation in violent action, either in Belgium or
elsewhere. S4B played into the diverse personal expectations of its supporters in the
same way IS would so successfully do some years later. Its highly publicised activist
mode – exactly the opposite modus operandi to the clandestine operations of the
older jihadi cells – helped to cultivate a group identity, so that participants felt as if
they finally belonged to a welcoming in-group. The highlighting within the group of
the ‘humiliation’ and ‘oppression of Muslims worldwide’ solidified the us-versus-
them outlook. The increasing emphasis on violence and street disorder satisfied
those who were seeking some form of activism. Preparation for martyrdom reflected
the need for heroism and respect for others. Belkacem was a hero for his followers,
‘some sort of pop star’.86
86 Kris Luyckx, counsel for Jejoen Bontinck (a repentant Syria fighter) in De Standaard, 30 August 2014.41
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEAnjem Choudary, the British leader of Sharia4UK, was one of the sources of inspira-
tion for the leadership of S4B, whom he manipulated and guided into their deliberate
strategy. They, in turn, tried to stimulate like-minded groups elsewhere, but had only
minimal success. These and other transnational bonds nevertheless reinforced the
group’s identity and the feeling of being part of a broad and global movement.87
Yet, the facilitating role of S4B and allies should not be overestimated, nor should the
impact of social media on their role as ‘recruitment multipliers’ be overstated. They
could only have this impact because the environment conducive for their success
was present. Without this facilitative breeding ground, the S4B discourse would have
fallen on deaf ears. As in the past, the narrative – the extremists’ ideology – is by itself
not the key to their success. Today too, context is essential for understanding the
current foreign fighters phenomenon in Europe or elsewhere.88 Even at the time of
writing, Belgians are still leaving for Syria (albeit in smaller numbers than before),
often teenagers and tweens, girls as well as boys, sometimes entire families, or
mothers with small children, even though organisations such as Sharia4Belgium
themselves have ceased to exist. Their role was taken over by peer recruitment and
by small, fluid networks of friends and kin, sometimes set up by individuals who do
not wish to leave themselves, but still want to have the feeling of being part of a
heroic battle. This ‘bandwagoning’ effect makes it particularly difficult for intelli-
gence services to detect new departures.89
87 Martijn de Koning e.a., Eilanden in een zee van ongeloof. Het verzet van activistische da’wa-netwerken in
België, Nederland en Duitsland. Nijmegen, Radboud University, 16 December 2014, pp. 116.
88 For Tajikistan, see: Karoun Demirjian, ‘New Russian migration laws boosts Islamic State recruitment in Tajik-
istan’, in The Guardian, 14 July 2015. For Tunisia, see: Serene Assir, ‘Forlorn Tunisia youth ripe for radicaliza-
tion’, in The Daily Star (Lebanon), 3 July 2015.
89 Jaak Raes, o.c.42
GAUGING THE THREAT
Attacks by returnees have been a constant concern for authorities ever since the
scale of the fourth foreign fighters wave became public. Trying to gauge the danger
and interpret the strategic rationale of IS’ attacks outside the core territory of Syria
and Iraq ‘is daunting’.90 Reliable information is scarce and IS’ decision-making proce-
dures hard to decipher. It is thus difficult to ascertain to what degree upper IS
echelons are involved in directing foreign attacks.
Clearly, not all returning foreign fighters are ticking time bombs. Not all return
harbouring ideas about attacking their home countries. In November 2015, the
Dutch intelligence services concluded that most returning foreign fighters in the
Netherlands did not pose a violent threat.91 In Belgium, only one third of the
returnees are arrested and sent to jail. But all countries nevertheless worry about the
potential threat these returnees might represent. The sheer number of returnees to
monitor overstretches the human and technical capabilities of police and intelligence
services. The threat these returnees represent ranges from post-traumatic stress
disorder symptoms to actual ambitions of attacking their home countries.
‘Frustrated travellers’, who are prevented from reaching Syria, are considered a
potential risk too.
The succession of terrorist plots and actual attacks in 2015 raised the question within
intelligence circles as to whether IS had changed its strategy. While it was assumed
that it was originally preoccupied with building its caliphate, some have suggested
that foreign attacks became a new front in reaction to the US-led coalition interven-
tion in September 2014. In early 2016, Europol suggested that IS had developed ‘an
external action command trained for special forces style attacks in the international
environment’.92
Solid evidence of the existence of such a dedicated structure is hard to come by.
Moreover, closer examination of plots in the West since 2014 seems to indicate that
attacking the West (and foreign countries in general) has been part IS’ range of activ-
ities at least since the declaration of the caliphate in June 2014. The organisation
seems to have always espoused foreign attacks whenever the opportunity presented
itself, as was the case with Mehdi Nemmouche. In Syria, he probably liaised with
other Belgian-French foreign fighters in order to plan his shooting at the Jewish
Museum.
90 Shiraz Maher, ‘Death to the grayzone’, in New Statesman, 20-26 November 2015.
91 https://english.nctv.nl/currenttopics/press_releases/2015/threat-level-for-the-netherlands-remains-
substantial-real-and-complex-threat.aspx.
92 See note 19.43
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEWhat has changed, however, in the course of 2015 is the increasing professionaliza-
tion of foreign attacks and the expanding interaction between grassroots groups and
operatives in Syria and Iraq. Clearly, the successive attacks in 2015 show a ‘lessons
learned’ pattern by which each new plot attempted to correct the failings and the
weaknesses of earlier ones. Planners are increasingly sensitive to the prerequisites
of operational security. The financial means involved (for armament, logistics and
travel) also seem to indicate at least some support in Syria. Even if local networks are
partly financed by criminal activities, the succession of plots required an amount of
money that possibly was not derived solely from local activities. Communication,
coordination and shelter provided for returnees during the 2015 plots also seem to
hint at some degree of structured planning.
But the actual organisation of the attacks probably resides with local operatives. This
explains why armed assaults have now become the preferred mode of action. These
are easier to conduct without external assistance than complex bombing plots.93
Assault weapons have become the weapons of choice and localised urban shootings
might be for some time the new modus operandi. Mohammed Merah was the first
to introduce this type of operation in 2012. The failed Verviers plot and the Paris
attacks were indeed of the same type.
Due to the opportunity offered by a real training field in Syria and Iraq, experiences
and techniques can now be transferred onto a new generation of wannabe terrorists.
Moreover, as was the case earlier with Afghanistan, networks of personal inter-
linkages are again being established. The longer individuals stay in the Levant, the
greater the risk that violence becomes trivialised for them, hardening their mental
setup to the point of envisaging suicide attacks and strengthening their determina-
tion to attack their home country.
Some of the Belgian foreign fighters have now been in the battlefield of the Levant
for over three years. They are not all operating together on the battlefield. Like other
foreign fighters, they have mostly been organised in linguistically delineated battal-
ions, or katibas. Most French-speaking Belgians and French fighters in turn have
been integrated into the katiba al-Battar, one of the strongest vanguard battalions
of IS.94 Originally a Libyan-dominated fighting group, it has been spotted in some of
the heaviest battles in Syria and in Iraq acting as the IS’ equivalent of the Foreign
Legion. But the French foreign fighters within this katiba do not always seem to be
held in high regard. They are accused of behaving as if they were still in their cité.95
Nevertheless, this katiba seems to have been the matrix from which many of the
attacks against France and Belgium sprang.96 As was the case in Afghanistan, even
93 ‘From Failed Bombings to Armed Jihadist Assaults’, in Stratfor, Security Weekly, 22 May 2010.
94 Michael Weiss, ‘Confessions of an ISIS spy’, in The Daily Beast, 18 November 2015.
95 Le Monde, 6 January 2016.
96 Elise Vincent, ‘Les liens de sang entre djihadistes français et belges’, in Le Monde, 23 December 2015.44
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEafter IS in the Levant has been defeated, these networks will continue for some time,
before they too will eventually wane.
Terrorism must be kept in proper perspective. However serious a security risk they
present, returning Western foreign fighters do not represent for their home
countries the same existential threat as they and their peers do for the people and
the countries of the Levant, where they do indeed threaten the foundation of states
and governments. One day, IS’ appeal will have reached its pinnacle and the hype
surrounding the organisation will evaporate, as the result of the very same forces
that put an end to the earlier waves of foreign fighters: enhanced law enforcement,
annihilation of the staging ground in the Levant, disgust caused by IS’ atrocities, the
apprehension that, this time too, other Muslims are the organisations’ principal
victims, and, specific to the fourth wave of IS-inspired foreign fighters, disenchant-
ment with living conditions in the caliphate and the realisation that its apocalyptic
predictions fail to materialise.97
But until that happens, Europe will have to get used to the ‘new normal’ of local
attacks, plots, false alarms and disruption. This security risk needs to be matched by
good intelligence and law enforcement, the twin pillars of classical European
counterterrorism. The major difference the current situation represents is the sheer
volume of potential perpetrators, overwhelming security and intelligence mecha-
nisms and leading to calls for far-reaching legislative and constitutional changes. But
Baltasar Garzón, Spain’s most prominent counterterrorism magistrate, remains
adamant: ‘[After 2005], we didn’t act differently as when we acted against ETA. We
used the existing legal arsenal. ... The sole answer to terror is the legislation and the
law.’98
The major threat we face might well be one of our own making. Terrorism is all about
the psychological and political impact attacks seek to provoke. Knee-jerk reactions
overinflate the threat and misjudge the origins of the fourth foreign fighters wave,
thus risking an unravelling of the social fabric of our society, which is precisely the
goal jihadi groups have been pursuing all along.
97 ‘Time is working against the Islamic State’, in Stratfor, Security Weekly, 5 November 2015.
98 Baltasar Garzón and Dolores Delgado, quoted in De Standaard Weekblad, 2 January 2016.45
LOOKING BEYOND RADICALISATION – 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Eliminating the push factors that motivate European youngsters to depart for the
Syrian-Iraqi war theatre cannot possibly be addressed by Muslim communities alone.
Not only is Islam not the primary driver of their behaviour, their networks moreover
operate at the margins of local community life, Muslim organisations and mosques,
with whom they have almost no interaction. Nor can the push factors be neutralised
solely by local authorities, however crucial their role might be in attempting to recon-
nect (potential) Syria travellers with society.
‘Can you deradicalise a Muslim?’ a respected Belgian newspaper once wondered,
undoubtedly not realizing how belittling such a headline was to Belgian citizens of
Muslim faith. It expresses a widely held view in Europe, and in Belgium too, that
Islam, and in particular a Salafist reading of it, is the key problem and that the
solution is to ‘instil radical Muslims with more appropriate thoughts.’99 This has been
the angle chosen by the UK government of David Cameron: ‘The root cause of this
threat to our security is quite clear. It is a poisonous ideology of Islamist extremism
that’s condemned by all faiths and faith leaders.’100 Other governments have
followed suit. After the January 2015 attacks in Paris, Cameron’s French colleague
Manuel Valls also endorsed this approach: ‘We have an enemy, and we have to
identify it as such, it’s radical Islam and one of its elements, Salafism’.101 In the
Netherlands too, a vigorous public debate is on-going on the relations between
Salafism and jihadism, the former being called the conveyor belt to the latter. The
Belgian prime minister Charles Michel also opined that the culprit is ‘a fanatical
ideology that want to impose its obscurantist vision through extreme violence.’102
In media and official discourse – but also in deradicalisation programmes – radical-
isation is often still narrowed down to the notion of a radical narrative that an
individual catches as if it was a flu, and which then inexorably pushes him or her to
its seemingly logical end, terrorism. This is a caricature of what a radicalisation
process really represents. It is also a way of putting all the blame on the individual
and his family and at the same time neglecting the role society plays. From its incep-
tion, the concept of ‘radicalisation’ itself was already an oversimplification of an
extremely complex phenomenon at the intersection of individual pathways and a
societal context. In as far as the past can serve as a guide, efforts aimed at
99 De Standaard, 24 October 2014 and 9 January 2015.
100 Quoted in The Guardian, 29 August 2014.
101 Manuel Valls before the National Assembly, 18 November 2018. Quoted in Le Monde, 25 November 2015.
102 Charles Michel quoted in Le Monde, 1 February 2016.47
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEaddressing the extremist ideology – the narrative – have seldom proven to be
successful.103
An alternative explanation puts the blame exclusively on society, unable and
unwilling to accept newcomers and address structural discrimination. The foreign
fighter phenomenon is supposed to signal the failure of integration policies. This,
too, is a reductionist statement of convenience. It not only reduces the individuals
involved to mere puppets with no free will, it also turns a blind eye to the numerous
success stories of migrants and their kin, successfully integrating into their new home
country. It also overestimates the size of the subgroup in question. The jihadi scene
in Belgium, as in the rest of Europe, is small and isolated, both in quantitative
(numbers) as in qualitative (influence) terms.
Europol recently suggested dropping the term ‘radicalisation’ altogether, and
replacing it with ‘violent extremist social trend’.104 Today’s foreign fighters phenom-
enon is indeed not the result of the radicalisation process as it is usually understood
(and succinctly described above). The fourth wave of foreign fighters is essentially an
alternative pathway for deviant behaviour or, for some, a journey to Utopia, rooted
in a ‘no future’ subculture. Vulnerability, frustration, perceptions of inequity and a
feeling that by travelling to Syria they have nothing to lose and everything to gain,
are common traits among those involved. For most of them it is thus akin to street
gangs, drug trafficking, (juvenile) delinquency, with a larger-than-life dimension
added in. But the route that they choose is one that not only leads them to
extremism and terrorist violence, but also engenders a fierce backlash in their home
country by enhancing the animosity against Islam, Muslims and migrants – which is
precisely part of the environment they fled from in the first place.
Following the protests in Baltimore in April 2015, Barack Obama drew a surprising
parallel that can be easily applied to the current foreign fighters phenomenon. After
meeting youngsters in the Bronx, he referred to ‘a sense of unfairness and power-
lessness’:
We see ourselves in these young men. I grew up without a dad. I grew up lost
sometimes and adrift, not having a sense of a clear path. The only difference
between me and a lot of other young men in this neighborhood and all across
the country is that I grew up in an environment that was a little more
forgiving. And at some critical points, I had some people who cared enough
about me to give me a second chance, or a third chance, or give me a little
guidance when I needed it, or to open up a door that might otherwise been
closed. I was lucky.105
103 Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind. New York/London, Routledge, 2009, p. 4.
104 See note 19.
105 Remarks by the President at Launch of the My Brother’s Keeper Alliance. New York, West Bronx, 4 mei 2015.
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/04/remarks-president-launch-my-brothers-
keeper-alliance).48
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEIn the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the French novelist Erik Orsenna desig-
nated in the same vein ‘le terreau de désespérance’ [the breeding ground of hope-
lessness] as the real culprit. This description closely fits Latifa Ibn Ziaten’s ‘feeling of
abandonment’. In her book Mort pour la France (2013), she passionately argues with
youngsters, including those living in the Izards district of Toulouse where
Mohammed Merah grew up: reconcile with the country where you were born and
raised. But at the same time, Marianne too is in need of some soul searching in order
to overcome her own demons and to take care of all her children – without excep-
tion.
Is there a light at the end of the tunnel? Following the series of tragedies in 2014 and
2015, authorities decided upon highly visible, far-reaching repressive measures.
These are the easiest part of the answer. Some of the measures were merely meant
as window-dressing. Others might turn out to be irrelevant or, worse, counterpro-
ductive. But at the same time there seems to be an increased consensus, at least
within the Belgian polity, that repression alone will never be adequate by itself, and
that prevention is equally crucial.
‘Prevention’, however, comes in many different forms and colours. Understood as
the strategy to counter the push factors behind the youngsters’ rush into Syria, it is
a complex endeavour that will need time, resources, patience and forward-thinking.
Results will never be straightforward. Compared to repressive measures, preventive
efforts will always be more circumspect and difficult to gauge. Moreover, prevention
lends itself less to political grandstanding. Even more important is realising that
government action can only be part of the solution, perhaps even only a small part.
In the realm of security, authorities play an irreplaceable role. In prevention,
however, responsibility is much more widely shared and the involvement of many is
needed.
Fortunately, today authorities, Muslim communities and local organisations feel
pressed to address the issue head-on. Their quest for explanations and remedies to
resist the lure of IS has visibly become more persistent, judging by the rapidly
increasing number of meetings (both public and informal), workshops, in-house
discussion groups and self-help groups for affected parents.
Stopping youngsters from leaving in the first place is the essence of effective preven-
tion. Each departure represents a human tragedy. From a place where only the law
of the strongest prevails, no one returns unharmed, and certainly not a teenager or
a young person in his or her twenties, who is at odds with himself or herself, and with
society. Neither polity nor academia has fully come to grips with the fault line in
society that gave birth to the subculture in which this fourth wave of foreign fighters
thrive.
The real issue is to find a way to make them understand that they have a future and
thus a stake in society. No deradicalisation nor disengagement program will bear49
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEfruit if it fails to recognise the importance of addressing the context that permitted
the emergence of the current foreign fighters wave and that provides motivation and
direction for groups and individuals to use violence.106
To this end, the efforts of many are needed: government, civil society, media and
citizens. If this is not addressed, once IS’ momentum has passed and its winners’
image crumbled, other hot spots will arise and again attract youngsters into similar
journeys. Only when hope in the future is offered will the breeding ground dry up and
youngsters cease to be drawn ‘to a country they do not know, in a culture they are
not familiar with, and where a language is spoken that they do not understand.’107
Policy recommendations
Just like the previous three waves of foreign fighters since the 1980s, the fourth wave
of foreign fighters will ultimately end. But the time needed to reach this point also
depends on the measures we collectively take in reacting to the phenomenon. What
might effectively contribute to countering the fourth wave of foreign fighters – and
protect a new generation from following suit?
Firstly, reframe the debate. The explanation for the behaviour of (candidate) foreign
fighters ‘is found not in how they think, but rather in how they feel.’108 Religion is not
of the essence. Personal motives are, in a complex interplay between individual
pathways and context. Unless we understand how these motivations derive from a
‘no future’ subculture and not simply from a narrative, prevention will fail. Efforts
should thus be concentrated on first-line prevention directed at identifying individ-
uals, and youngsters in particular, that seem to be stuck or stranded. Existing preven-
tion mechanisms and agencies are best equipped to deal with this. Enhancing their
expertise in this novel form of deviant behaviour will result in better long-term
results than creating a separate fully fledged ‘deradicalisation’ policy domain.
Secondly, focus on tailor-made approaches. One-size-fits-all overall deradicalisation
initiatives, e.g., counter-narrative spots on television, will be of marginal use. Person-
to-person interaction has the best chance of succeeding, if three conditions can be
met:
• Since personal pathways are diverse, a personalised approach is required,
whereby the person involved is seen as an individual, not as a member of a
(hostile) group.
• The person must be receptive to discussion. Hence the importance of identifying
mentors or coaches and channels that can gain the person’s trust.
106 See note 13.
107 Ben Hamidou, who plays the role of ideological leader of a group of men leaving for Syria, in Djihad, a
successful play in Brussels theaters in 2014. In Brussel Nieuws, 12 December 2014 (http://www.brussel-
nieuws.be/nl/cultuur/toneelstuk-djihad-neemt-radicalisme-op-de-korrel).
108 Marc Sageman, ‘The next generation of terror’, in Foreign Policy, March-April 2008, p. 40.50
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVE• Perspective must be offered. Reconnecting him or her to the (local) society is the
goal. The aim should not be to attempt to change radical thinking, nor to lecture
them. Otherwise, we risk seeing a ‘deradicalised’ returnee simply revert to his
previous life of deviant behaviour, such as drug-trafficking or his former street
gang.
Thirdly, separate the discussion on Islam in Europe from deradicalisation initia-
tives. The discussion of a ‘European Islam’ is a discussion worth holding for its own
merits, on its own terms, and with Muslims in the lead. It should not pushed within
the deradicalisation framework. Not only will this not work as envisaged, it will also
harden positions, corrode an already fragile social fabric, and thus backfire. Whoever
wants to participate in this discussion should moreover try to comprehend how
Muslim families and communities today feel devastated, in shock and lost in the
current polarised climate.109 This climate enhances an already prevalent feeling that,
whatever effort they might undertake, they will never be accepted as full members
of Western societies.
Fourthly, don’t get terrorised by terrorists. Following the July 2005 bombings in
London, the London mayor Ken Livingstone reacted in simple and inclusive terms:
I’d like to thank Londoners for the calm way in which they have responded to
this cowardly attack ... I want to say one thing specifically to the world today.
This was not a terrorist attack against the mighty and the powerful. It was not
aimed at Presidents or Prime Ministers. It was aimed at ordinary, working-
class Londoners, black and white, Muslim and Christian, Hindu and Jew, young
and old. It was an indiscriminate attempt to slaughter, irrespective of any
considerations for age, for class, for religion, or whatever. That isn’t an
ideology, it isn’t even a perverted faith – it is just an indiscriminate attempt at
mass murder and we know what the objective is. They seek to divide
Londoners. They seek to turn Londoners against each other. ... Londoners will
not be divided by this cowardly attack. They will stand together in solidarity
alongside those who have been injured and those who have been bereaved
and that is why I’m proud to be the mayor of that city.110
Inclusiveness is a tough thing to come by in today’s frenzied debates, at least in
Europe. In the United States, however, President Obama does not shy away from
publicly acknowledging the growing concerns, fears, and feelings among Muslim
Americans of being considered second-class citizens.111
109 Birsen en Fatma Taspinar, quoted in De Standaard Weekblad, 19 December 2015.
110 Quoted in Financial Times, 7 July 2005.
111 Remarks by the President at Islamic Society, Baltimore, 3 February 2016. Available at: https://www.white-
house.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/03/remarks-president-islamic-society-baltimore.51
FACING THE FOURTH FOREIGN FIGHTERS WAVEFinally, invest in intelligence (for a proper long-term perspective) and pursue short-
term operational information sharing. Good intelligence and good policing has
always been the first line of defence against terrorism in Europe. Most perpetrators
of recent terrorist attacks were known to police and intelligence. No elaborate
network of deradicalisation officials looking for signs of radicalisation was needed for
this. This by itself illustrates the circumscribed nature of the kinship and friendship
networks behind the fourth foreign fighters wave. In order to put this reality in
proper perspective, a comparison with Northern Irish terrorism might be instructive.
Andrew Parker, head of the British MI5, made this comment on the latter:
We ... detect and disrupt the vast majority of their attempts. But occasionally
we are all stung with the tragedy of wanton murder, as we saw most recently
with the shooting of David Black last November. Rejecting the political
process in Northern Ireland, these ragged remnants of a bygone age are in a
cul-de-sac of pointless violence and crime with little community support. We
will continue to work with the police to put these thugs and killers in front of
the Courts.112
If the religious frame of reference had not gained the traction it did, this could just as
well apply to the fourth wave of foreign fighters. They indeed enjoy as little commu-
nity support as the terrorists referred to by Andrew Parker in the case of Northern
Ireland.113 Acting upon this precedent when reacting to jihadi plots and threats
would enhance resilience, give them a place in our thinking and in our everyday life,
thus depriving their perpetrators of their capacity to further tear apart the social
fabric of societies by enhancing fear of migrants and Islam.
112 Address by the Director General of the Security Service, Andrew Parker, to the Royal United Services Insti-
tute (RUSI), Whitehall, 8 October 2013. Available at: www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/who-we-are/staff-
and-management/director-general/speeches-by-the-director-general/director-generals-speech-at-rusi-
2013.html.
113 http://english.dohainstitute.org/content/cb12264b-1eca-402b-926a-5d068ac60011.52
